The
stakes
The
IPCC has confirmed that the Earth has a limited capacity to absorb
greenhouse gas emissions (i.e. a limited “emission or carbon
budget”). Senior economists have confirmed that this budget could
be worth in excess of one trillion US dollars annually.i
Negotiations over a global goal and mitigation commitments are
addressing how to share this limited atmospheric resource between
rich and poor nations. At stake in the climate negotiations,
therefore, is among the largest divisions of wealth and resources in
modern history.
Annex
I countries have already used more than their fair share of this
budget, and have long understood what’s at stake in the
negotiations. They seek to continue their over-use of a shared
resource by securing substantial “assigned amounts” of emissions
based on their high historical levels, while locking the South into
considerably lower and declining per-capita levels.
Non-Annex
I countries are rapidly beginning to understand the implications of
an unjust distribution of the remaining atmospheric space, and of the
financing and technology required to live well within its
constraints. A number of countries have called for more equitable
approaches taking into account historical responsibility, an
equitable allocation of a shared atmospheric resource, per-capita
accumulative emission levels, and the climate debt owed by developed
countries to developing countries for their over-use of shared
atmospheric space (“emissions debt”) and for the devastating
consequences of climate change on developing countries (“adaptation
debt”).
Objectives
of developed countries
Both
Annex I and non-Annex I countries seek an effective solution to
climate change. Annex I countries, however, are concerned about the
costs implementing their commitments under the present Climate
Convention, which is fair to developing countries, reflects the deal
struck at the Rio Earth Summit, and clearly defines the common but
differentiated responsibilities of developed and developing
countries.
They
are consequently seeking to change the Convention (either directly or
through a new agreement) in a manner that:
- Allows
them to continue their high per-capita emissions (and therefore to
secure more than their fair share of remaining atmospheric space);
- Places
emissions limitation on non-Annex I countries (via a global goal;
deviations from BAU; economy-wide low carbon plans);
- Limits
and passes on a considerable portion of the costs of adapting to
climate change to non-Annex I countries;
- Limits
and passes on a considerable portion of the costs of financing and
technology to non-Annex I countries; and
- Maintains
or improves their economic competitiveness in international markets,
by passing on costs, controlling technology (e.g. through IPRs) and
further liberalizing markets.ii
The
economic stakes are high. To achieve their objectives developed
countries will likely use all the strategies and tactics available to
them to convince, and if necessary, to divide and rule the developing
countries.
Learning
the lessons of other forumsiii
Developing
countries can learn much by examining the approaches used by
developed countries in other international forums, such as the World
Trade Organization.
Developed
countries have a range of means at their disposal to divide
developing countries and secure outcomes that favor them without
necessarily favoring the South. And they are quite adept in using
them. As reported
in the Financial Times:
The
European Union has long been renowned
for
skilful use of ‘divide and rule’ tactics in
global
trade talks to play opponents off against
each
other.iv
Developing
countries, at the same time, have developed considerable experience
in those negotiations that could be applied usefully in the climate
negotiations to maintain unity and solidarity and to ensure an agreed
outcome that addresses the needs of all developing countries.
Developing
countries know there is strength in unity. As stated by one WTO
negotiator about the G20 – a key grouping of developing countries
in WTO negotiations:
The
G20 has, to my mind, provided a forum for its members to fight
collectively for their
interests.
All major members realise the
importance
of this – there is strength in unity.
The
major members, if not all, have realised
that
any short-sighted step taken to succumb
to
the divisive techniques used by the majors
will
go against their interests in the long run. If we leave the group for
little crumbs here and there, we will look like fools.v
Building
on the experience of seasoned climate negotiators, and of negotiators
in other forums, developing countries can ensure they maintain a
united front under what will inevitably be growing political pressure
from Annex I countries.
Controlling
the discourse
One
key strategy of developed countries is controlling the discourse or
narrative in which negotiations are set – shaping the expectations
of decision-makers and the public about objectives, and what
constitutes success and failure.
Annex
I countries have crafted a public discourse to support their
objectives. The terms “post-Kyoto agreement” and “post-2012
agreement”, widely repeated in the press, are inaccurate
descriptions of current negotiations. As noted by one senior
developing country official: “the Kyoto Protocol is not yoghurt; it
has no expiry date”. The 2012 date is simply the commencement of
the second commitment period. Negotiations under the Convention are
for action “now, up to and beyond 2012.
Also,
the Bali Action Plan calls for an “agreed outcome” and a
“decision” and makes no reference to an “agreement”. Parties
to the negotiations differ on the form of the outcome. Despite this,
many members of the public, the media and governments continue to use
the post-2012/Post-Kyoto agreement language when, as yet, agreement
by all Parties is lacking on the form of the agreed outcome.
Misleading
the media
In
some cases, controlling the discourse extends to actively advancing
falsehoods. This, of course, is difficult to prove. But when media
stories are consistently inaccurate across different sources, there
is circumstantial evidence of intent to mislead. Reporting on the
February 2007 G8 meeting provides an example. The Guardian reported
(inaccurately) that:
Delegates
agreed that developing countries would have to face targets for
cutting greenhouse gas emissions as well as rich countries.vi
The
BBC similarly reported (inaccurately):
Delegates
agreed that developing countries would also have to meet targets for
cutting greenhouse gas emissions, as well as rich countries.vii
Of
course, there are a variety of explanations for systematic mistakes
by the media. But inaccurate reporting is a such a regular occurrence
after most major climate gatherings that there is grounds to believe
there are active attempts, in some quarters, to mislead the media.
Developing
countries thus need to actively (and where possible, collectively)
project their views to the media in order to prevent it from being
misled.
Ambush
and push
At
the December 2007 Bali Climate Conference, developed countries sought
to secure a global goal for emissions reduction, before developing
countries understood the implications. By securing a global goal, as
well as a developed country cut under the Kyoto Protocol (on a
separate track), developed countries would have effectively set a
“residual” target for developing countries. (i.e. global goal,
minus Annex I target, equals non-Annex I target).
Developing
countries ultimately declined to agree a global goal in Bali,
recognizing that to do so without clear commitments from developed
countries on finance, technology and adaptation would undermine their
interests. Ultimately, a footnote was added to the Bali Action Plan
referring to certain sections of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
(IPCC 4AR) as a placeholder for later efforts to establish a global
goal.
Developed
countries have subsequently continued to add in additional language
and obligations, over and above those agreed in the Bali Action Plan.
These include references to deviations from “business as usual”;
division of NAMAs into “autonomous, supported and carbon market”;
“registering” all NAMAs; or requiring of “low-carbon
development strategies”.
It
is a well-established strategy for developed countries to introduce
new issues onto the agenda with little time for developing countries
to analyze them carefully, coordinate and respond. The goal is to
keep the South on the back foot, reacting rather than setting the
agenda.
Mischaracterizing
policy as science
Since
Bali, some Annex I countries have actively mischaracterized their own
negotiating positions on burden sharing as “science”, thereby
attempting to avoid or limit discussions about equity.
Some
countries have characterized information contained in IPCC 4AR as: 1)
establishing or supporting a 2C
global goal; and 2) stating that to achieve this goal Annex I
countries should reduce emissions by 25-40% from 1990. Based on this,
they suggest that subsequent “scientific studies” say non-Annex I
countries would need to deviate by “15-30% from baseline”
emissions to achieve a 2C
objective.
In
actual fact, the IPCC makes no such policy recommendations about
burden sharing, and does not claim to do so. The 25-40% range is
taken from a box (Box 13.7) summarizing “allocation studies”
(i.e. studies dividing the global carbon budget between rich and poor
countries), most of which were funded by EU institutions or
undertaken by EU-based analysts.
Rather
than engaging in an open and honest dialogue about effort sharing,
these countries have tried to “hoodwink” the South into a highly
inequitable sharing of a limited global resource by claiming that
these particular shares are required by science, when nothing could
be further from the truth.
Obscuring
the details
Another
strategy is to construct proposals in a manner that makes it
difficult to evaluate the implications for developing countries.
The
EU’s proposal for a global goal and mitigation by Annex I and
non-Annex I countries, for example, is particularly opaque. The
expected efforts of developed and developing countries are
denominated as cuts from 1990 levels and as deviations from business
as usual, respectively – i.e. as apples and oranges – making it
difficult to compare them.
If
adopted the EU proposal would, in effect, permit countries such as
the United States to continue emitting at around 14 tonnes CO2 per
capita, and would lock in developing countries such as India to
around 3 tonnes per capita.
It
would consolidate for the Annex I countries a disproportionate share
of a global emission budget worth over a trillion dollars annually,
constituting a major subsidy by developing countries (who would forgo
part of their rightful share of the remaining atmospheric space) to
developed countries.
Some
developing countries have not fully comprehended the massive
distributional and equity issues at play in the current negotiations,
and the implications for their future development – in part because
the implications of proposals by the developed countries have
remained so obscure.
Building
a Trojan Horse
In
some international negotiations, developed country officials and/or
consultants are occasionally included in the delegations of
developing countries, on the basis that they can help to build the
capacity of these delegations or support them in the negotiations.
In
many cases, these individuals are great champions of the South. But
in some cases there is reason to doubt their motives. In some cases,
they may actively provide information back to developed countries, or
advocate for developed country positions with developing countries,
or develop positions and strategies that divide developing countries
from each other.
In
the climate negotiations, a number of the members of developing
country delegations were formerly on the delegations of Annex I
countries, or are funded by Annex I countries. These officials sit
in the meetings of the G77 and China, the LDC group, the AOSIS group
and other groupings. In some cases, they advance positions that are
facially inconsistent with the positions of groupings of which their
countries are part.
For
example, one country with limited capacity (represented primarily by
a non-national) has put forward positions that mirror those put
forward by its former colonial power on behalf of the EU. Indeed,
their proposal went even further than those by the EU by calling for
an “absolute” emission reduction by developing countries by 2050.
The proposal is facially inconsistent with proposals by the LDC group
and the G77 and China, which that developing country has also
supported.
Carving
out special deals
Developed
countries also seek to split up the developing countries by offering
special deals to sub-groups of countries in exchange for their
cooperation on other issues under negotiations.
These
strategies are a more sophisticated version of the divide and rule
strategy. In the context of the WTO, for example:
… attempts
to break countries
away
from the G20 have been replaced with a more
sophisticated
variant of the ‘divide and rule’ strategy, as
individual
country groupings have been offered preferential
access
to developed country markets in return for their
cooperation
at the WTO.
At
the WTO, the EU sought to define a common set of interests for least
developed and vulnerable countries and to use this to divide the
South. In a letter by the EU to WTO Members (May 2004) it stated:
Least
developed countries and other weak or vulnerable developing countries
in a similar
situation
– essentially the G90 – should not have
to
open their markets beyond their existing
commitments,
and should be able to benefit from
increased
market access offered by both
developed
and advanced developing countries.
A
number of countries (both developing and developed) immediately
expressed
concern
about such
an obvious attempt to divide the WTO
membership
at a time when it most needs to be united
in
a search for a framework solution to the Doha Round.
Despite
knowing there is strength in unity, developing countries have often
conceded substantial ground on the promise of future benefits only to
find the results lacking. In the context of the climate negotiations,
for instance, support promised to least developed countries has not
materialized in the context of the LDCF at the GEF, and developed
countries have instead chosen to establish new funding arrangements
under the World Bank, despite the concerns of many developing
countries.
Establishing
new groupings of countries
In
some cases, where it is difficult to divide developing countries
using existing groupings, developed countries seek to establish new
groupings as the basis of divide and rule tactics.
At
the WTO, for example, developed countries have actively championed
new categories of countries – such as the “small and vulnerable
economies” – with the goal of offering these countries promises
of favorable treatment in return for breaking with their fellow
developing countries. Smaller groupings, by and large, are easier to
pressure and cheaper to fund.
Similar
tactics may be employed in the climate negotiations. Some developed
countries are championing new groupings of small and vulnerable
countries. The stated intention is to improve the voice and
visibility of poor and vulnerable countries and ensure they receive
fair treatment in the negotiations. This, of course, is desirable.
However,
concerns have been raised that such a group will be used for quite
different purposes, including to: 1) isolate the poorest countries
from the support of larger developing countries (reducing rather than
increasing their leverage in demanding considerable emission
reductions from the North); 2) divide the South, reducing its
capacity to secure major commitments from developed countries on
financing and technology; and 3) pit poor countries against poor
countries, rather than unifying them in their claims on the rich
countries, which are largely responsible for causing climate change.
Ultimately,
this approach may undermine the very interests of the vulnerable
countries it supposedly seeks to promote. A divided South is less
likely to receive either deep cuts from Annex I or substantial
financing and technological support (for mitigation by non-Annex I),
which may ultimately result in worse climate impacts for the
vulnerable countries. And without the backing of the large developing
countries, the vulnerable countries seem unlikely in practice to
receive much support for adaptation.
Setting
up the blame game
The
Annex I countries have already used the media to characterize larger
developing countries such as China as “reluctant” to negotiate,
and the United States’ recent engagement as progressive and as
“unlocking the negotiations”.viii
In
fact, China has been constructive in international negotiations, and
active in its domestic efforts to limit the growth of emissions. The
United States, by contrast, has so far failed to provide detailed
proposals and has hardly “unlocked the negotiations”. Indeed, it
has failed fundamentally to cut emissions since signing the UNFCCC
and, unlike China, is not a Party to the Kyoto Protocol and still has
no comprehensive national plan in place for limiting emissions
(though some State level efforts have been impressive).
The
Annex I countries are using all means to distract attention from
their own failures to implement the Convention, mount pressure on
developing countries, and to set up the blame game in the event the
fail to get their way in Copenhagen, and the meeting is not deemed a
success.
Divide
and rule narratives
Justifiably
some small island states have emphasized their sovereign right to
“survive” as a State. They have also noted the value of human
rights in implementing climate policy.
Some
developed countries, and some NGOs, are supporting the development of
narratives that are prejudicial to the common interests of developing
countries.
Some
actors in the North are seeking to juxtapose a “right to survival”
narrative with a “right to development” narrative. In other
words, India should give up some part of its “right to development”
in order to secure Small Island States’ “right to survive”.
Such
a narrative pits poor against the poor. It falsely pits the
well-being of around 50 million people in small island states with
that of more than a billion living below the poverty line.
It
shifts their focus from jointly seeking deep cuts by Annex I
countries (providing atmospheric space for the South) and substantial
financing and technology (supporting emission reductions in the
South).
The
intended outcome is: 1) lower costs and greater atmospheric space for
the North; and 2) greater costs and lower atmospheric space for the
South – an outcome that is clearly preferable to the developed
countries, but unlikely in the interest of any developing country.
Forum
shopping
Larger
developed countries and country groupings – such as the European
Union – coordinate actions across a number of different forums,
with the goal of securing compromises by exploiting the challenges of
capacity and coordination faced by developing countries.
The
EU, for instance, has actively sought declarations with various
different developing country groupings – such as the African Union
or the ACP countries. They rely on the fact that the developing
country officials negotiating these statements (often secretariat
staff, and officials who do not work on climate change) do not know
the full details of the climate negotiations.
The
EU, supported by the Climate Secretariat, sought for a long time to
include language calling for a “ratifiable outcome” in Copenhagen
– referring to a new treaty, when it is quite aware that developing
countries have not agreed to such an outcome in the climate
negotiations.
The
text of these declarations will be brought to the notice of Ministers
during the final stages of the negotiations, in order to pressure
them into accepting language that their negotiators have fought to
prevent, on the basis that the country has already accepted it
elsewhere.
Establishing
forums outside UNFCCCC
A
specific case of forum shopping is the creation of new forums outside
the UNFCCC designed explicitly to discuss climate change, beyond the
reach of the majority of developing countries.
The
Major Economies Forum, established by the United States and now
supported by many developed countries, is emerging as one place where
the larger developed countries meet with larger developing countries,
to the exclusion of the vast majority of developing countries.
The
G8 has also served as a place where developed countries develop
common positions to put forward within the UNFCCC. The inclusion of
large developing countries (referred to as “G8 plus 5”) is
providing another forum in which developed countries seek to cut
deals with some but not all developing countries.
Conducting
discussions in developed country-led forums allows those countries to
control the messaging, leading to inaccurate media coverage and
biased outcomes (see “misleading the media”, above).
By
inviting larger developing countries to discuss climate change on
their “turf”, the developed countries can also control the
agenda, and foster distrust between larger and smaller developing
countries, which rightly feel excluded from these discussions. While
it is valid for different countries to meet in different forums, care
must be exercised to ensure it does not have adverse effects on
developing country unity under mounting pressure.
Inappropriate
roles for chairs/public officials
Chairs
and public officials (e.g. heads of Secretariats) have been used to
advance agendas that are at odds with the stated positions and
interests of developing countries. At the WTO’s Cancun
Ministerial:
In
addition to the use of private
mini-ministerials
to set the agenda for the talks, the key
documents
on which negotiations were to be based had bypassed any process of
approval by the WTO’s
membership.
Instead, the draft Ministerial Text was
submitted
to the Cancún Ministerial ‘on the personal
responsibility’
of … Chair of the General Council, with close support from
WTO
Director-General Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi. This
refusal
to transmit key negotiating texts through the
proper
channels had been repeatedly criticised in the
preceding
months for undermining the democratic basis
of
the WTO, turning it from a member-driven into a
Chair-driven
organization.ix
In
Bali, developing countries expressed concerns over the role of senior
Secretariat Staff. Concerns have also been raised about the balance
of a so-called “focus document” prepared by a Chair, which one
delegation dubbed the “selective document” on the basis it seemed
systematically to favor proposals from the North over those from the
South.
Presentation
of biased texts
One
particular concern is the development of biased negotiating texts,
which place developing countries behind the starting line before the
negotiations even begin in earnest.
In
the WTO and other forums, texts prepared by chairs have often
reflected a strong bias towards the interests and proposals of
developed and not developing countries. This, in some cases, reflects
common interests between a Chair and those countries. In other cases,
it reflects power politics and political pressure. In all cases, the
result is unfairness towards developing countries.
The
existence of bias in negotiating texts undermines trust and progress
in negotiations. At the WTO’s Cancun Ministerial, for example,:
As
pointed out by
numerous
delegations, [the] text was substantially based
on
the proposals made by the USA, EU and other
developed
countries – even where alternative proposals
had
been submitted by developing country members.x
As
a result of this “The
conspicuous
bias
of this draft made the whole process of negotiation
particularly
difficult, as Ministers were not presented with
options
on which to negotiate”.xi
In
the climate negotiations, developing countries in have expressed
concerns about the biased nature of documents prepared by the
Secretariat and Chair. Concerns include: 1) lack of balance in
structure and content; 2) exclusion of relevant proposals by
developing countries; and 3) inclusion of extraneous items from
developed countries (e.g. outside the negotiation mandate).
To
increase the likelihood of a fair outcome (but by no means guarantee
it), developing countries need to ensure that negotiations are
Party-driven and reflect the full and exact text of proposals put
forward by them. The compilation of texts without attribution, and
without reference to the relevant legal obligations being
implemented, is a recipe for unfair outcomes.
Green
rooms
In
the context of the WTO, small group settings – or “green rooms –
have been used to cut deals between small groups of powerful
countries, with participation (often largely symbolic) by
“representatives” of other countries. Green rooms have provided a
means for isolating “problematic” countries, advancing
negotiations with relatively inexperienced ministers, or excluding
key negotiators (on the basis of insufficient seniority).
Already
in Bali, the negotiations were held in small groupings of negotiators
and Ministers. These “green room” processes have been heavily
criticized in other international forums as undermining the
legitimacy of the process and any outcome. In Bali, Ministers and
other senior officials were excluded from discussions, on the basis
they were not on a list held by the Secretariat.
Developing
countries should demand that processes are open to all interested
Parties. Where small group processes are required they should, at a
minimum, be formally agreed by all Parties; Parties should select
their own representatives; and participation should reflect the
proportional representation of Parties (i.e. G77 should have numbers
reflecting its membership).
Green
men
In
the WTO, the Chair of the negotiations has appointed individuals to
“facilitate” the development of consensus on specific issues.
They became known as “green men” on the basis that, along with
green rooms, they offered a vehicle by which the chair could control
the negotiations ensuring a chair-driven rather than a Party-driven
process – one which usually resulted in the subordination of
developing country interests.
The
Chair of the AWG-LCA has proposed creating “focus groups which
would seek to narrow down options or flesh out promising ideas” to
be “facilitated by individuals” identified by the Chair. A number
of countries have raised questions about the basis upon which
countries would participate in the “focus group” and the role of
“facilitators”.
Moving
up the ladder
Ministerial-level
meetings and Summits are important ways of garnering political
support and buy-in from all countries. However, in many developing
countries - with limited resources and capacity for coordination
-Ministers and Heads of State are often not as conversant with the
politics and the detail of the climate change negotiations, as
Ministers and Heads of State from developed countries.
This
is sometimes used to the advantage of developed countries, and the
proliferation of Ministerial and Summit-level meetings to negotiate
and secure political agreement often marginalizes and sometimes
overturns the positions of developing country negotiators who “know
too much” and are therefore seen as obstacles by developed
countries to achieving their interests.
Use
of non-governmental organizations
NGOs
provide a very important and useful role in climate negotiations.
With the goal of enhancing this role, a number of governments fund
NGOs to participate in climate negotiations and related activities.
Some
governments, however, fund NGOs to provide “services” that the
government cannot undertake itself. These NGOs are little more than
arms of the governments who fund them. Their role is variously to
build consensus among NGOs to support the positions of the
governments that fund them, to gather intelligence, to lobby other
governments, and undertake capacity building that supports the
interests of their funders.
Understanding
the origin, membership and outlook of NGOs – and where they get
their information and funding – is important when evaluating their
positions and proposals.
Bringing
in outside expertise
Given
the economic interests at stake in the climate negotiations,
developed countries are drawing on negotiators from the WTO and
elsewhere who understand complex negotiations as well as the divide
and rule strategies that have worked in the WTO and other forums.
Senior
negotiators in the European Union, for example, have been responsible
for many of the strategies used, and positions adopted, in the WTO.
It remains to be seen whether their presence results in use in the
climate negotiations of the type of tactics for which the EU has
become well known elsewhere (see “Learning the lessons” above)
Overwhelming
numbers
Developed
countries also often bring large delegations to meetings, supported
by even larger groups of advisors. Large delegations allow developed
countries to drive the process, and ensure that developing countries
remain on the back foot – responding rather than directing the
course of discussions.
Large
delegations also provide other advantages. They allow developed
countries to tie up developing country negotiators in numerous
bilateral meetings. They ensure greater capacity for action with NGOs
and the media. They allow them to gather more intelligence about
their opponent’s positions and intentions.
Rumor
mongering
An
additional strategy is to spread rumors about the intentions of
different developing countries, with the goal of breaking trust and
creating discord among developing countries.
In
the context of the WTO:
The
EU was also accused of trying to undermine
developing
country unity during the Ministerial by
spreading
rumours … The USA was more direct in its attempts to destabilise
the
new developing country groupings, launching strong
attacks
against Brazil, in particular, as coordinator of the
G20.
This dual approach of a more subtle EU and more
outspoken
USA is a ‘good cop, bad cop’ ploy which the
two
have used before at the WTO.xii
Rumors
may be spread about the role or intention of coordinators supporting
developing country cooperation on different issues; or about the
intentions of larger countries. In some cases, developed countries
will play “good cop, bad cop” with the intention of wooing some
countries away from the group of developing countries. Developing
countries should name and shame any developed country that spreads
rumors with malicious intent.
Removing
delegates
A
common tactic towards the end of negotiations is to pressure or
remove the most effective negotiators from the South. There is a long
tradition of political pressure being used to remove the most
experienced and effective negotiators. At greatest risk are those who
are most effective in building Southern solidarity.
Negotiators
who are effective champions of the South are characterized to their
governments as “troublemakers” or as “intransigent”. In some
negotiations, developing country negotiators and Ambassadors have
been removed under direct pressure from developed countries; harming
not only the careers of the individuals who are effectively defending
the interests of their countries and other developing countries; but
compromising those interests.
Already,
in the context of climate negotiations, aspersions are being cast in
national capitals about the contribution of some developing country
negotiators – with the objective, it seems, of having them removed
from national delegations.
To
pre-empt these tactics, developing countries should actively support
each other in their national capitals, which should understand that
the greater the pressure from the North, the greater the likelihood
that their negotiator is fiercely and effectively defending their
national interest and the interests of all developing countries.
Strong-arm
tactics
Another
strategy widely used in other international forums is placing undue
pressure on developing country negotiators and governments.
In
the end-game of negotiations at the WTO, and other forums, hard-ball
negotiating strategies have been used to manufacture consent and
consensus. Tactics have involved:
- Threatening
cuts in aid budgets
- Threatening
loss of trade preferences
- Personal
attacks on ambassadors and negotiators (calling them “troublesome”)xiii
In
Bali, some developing countries were informed that they would suffer
losses of trade sanctions if they did not compromise and accept
positions offered by some developed countries. The likelihood of this
kind of pressure may well increase, as the countdown to Copenhagen
continues.
Developing
countries should thus be vigilant to expose tactics such as these as
highly inappropriate to any negotiations, including those involving
climate change.
i
Nicholas Stern (stating “at $40 per tonne CO2e a total world
allocation of rights of, say, 30Gt (roughly the required flows in
2030) would be worth $1.2 trillion per annum), in The Global Deal
(2009)
iii
For WTO related examples, this note draws on Action Aid’s “Divide
and Rule: The EU and US response to developing country alliances at
the WTO” (July 2004), available at:
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/1308/press_release.html
iv
The Financial Times, 14
April 2004
vi
Guardian,
16
February 2007
vii
BBC,
16 February 2007
viii
Guardian,
6 May 2009
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